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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN A TIME OF
INCREASING WORK-FAMILY CONFLICTS
Martin H. Malin*
The demographics of the workplace have changed substantially
since the nation's unemployment insurance system was enacted in
the 1930s. The number of dual-earner and single parent families
has increased dramatically. Yet, the basic requirements for eligi-
bility for unemployment compensation have not varied much
since their initial enactment. In this Article, Professor Malin
explores the availability of benefits to individuals who lose their
jobs because of conflicts between work and family responsibilities
and to unemployed individuals whose family responsibilities
restrict the types of jobs that they are able to take. He finds that
the states have differed greatly concerning the degree to which
they will recognize family responsibilities as a relevant consider-
ation in evaluating employees' behavior said to disqualify them
from benefits. Some states reach seemingly anomalous results,
such as granting benefits to employees fired for defying employer
directives that conflict with their family responsibilities but
denying benefits to employees who quit when faced with such
directives. Professor Malin analyzes the benefits eligibility re-
quirements and finds that disqualifications for discharges for
misconduct, quits without just cause attributable to the employer,
unavailability for work, and rejections of suitable employment
operationalize the restriction of unemployment benefits to job
losers, rather than job leavers. He observes, however, that these
terms are laden with value judgments. He traces an emerging
public justice value judgment that employers may no longer
demand absolute adherence to their directives without regard for
employee family responsibilities. He finds this value judgment
evident in family leave and related legislation and in arbitration
awards concerning discipline under collective bargaining agree-
ments. He provides a framework for analyzing the unemployment
compensation claims of individuals whose family responsibilities
have caused them to lose their jobs or to restrict the types of jobs
for which they are available.
* Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Law & the Workplace, Chicago-
Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. B.A. 1973, Michigan State
University; J.D. 1976, George Washington University. I wish to thank my friend,
Professor Laura Cooper who, in discussing my general work concerning work-family
conflicts and the law, first suggested that I examine the issue in the context of
unemployment insurance. I also wish to thank Naomi Avendano, Kathy Baker,
Alberto Benitez, Laura Cooper, Ann Hilton Fisher, Rick Hasen, and Margaret
Stapleton for helpful comments; Chicago-Kent students Amanda Howland and
Joseph Wibbels, Jr., for valuable research assistance; and the Marshall-Ewell
Research Fund at Chicago-Kent College of Law for financial assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Supporters in Congress of the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA)' were fond of declaring that, as a matter of basic
policy, American workers should not be forced to choose be-
tween caring for their loved ones and their jobs.2 The FMLA,
although important, is not a panacea for workers facing con-
flicts between employment and family responsibilities.
Workers may lose their jobs because of the need to respond to
family emergencies that fall outside the FMLA's coverage.3
Although many employers have become more "family
friendly" in their human resource policies, they do not view
accommodation of family responsibilities as an employee's
entitlement and retain the option to say "no" when they deem
it necessary.4
When workers must choose between their families and their
jobs and, as a result, find themselves unemployed, they may
seek unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. This Article
considers the degree to which such benefits should be avail-
able to these workers. Part I examines demographic trends in
1. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994)).
2. See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S1095 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Hatfield); 139 CONG. REC. H420 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Synar);
139 CONG. REC. H409 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. DeLauro); 139
CONG. REC. H367 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Godon); 139 CONG.
REC. S991 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bond); 138 CONG. REC. H9931
(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1992) (statement of Rep. Unsoeld); 138 CONG. REC. S14,858
(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1992) (statement of Sen. Adams); 138 CONG. REC. H8254 (daily
ed. Sept. 10, 1992) (statement of Rep. Gephardt); 138 CONG. REC. H8230 (daily ed.
Sept. 10, 1992) (statement Rep. Unsoeld); 138 CONG. REC. S12,104 (daily ed. Aug.
11, 1992) (statement of Sen. Biden); 138 CONG. REC. S12,095 (daily ed. Aug. 11,
1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell); 137 CONG. REC. H9732 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Wolpe); 137 CONG. REC. H9730 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1991) (state-
ment of Rep. Morella); 136 CONG. REC. H5485 (daily ed. July 25, 1990) (statement of
Rep. Clay); 138 CONG. REC. H2206 (daily ed. May 10, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Fazio); 136 CONG. REC. H2166 (daily ed. May 9, 1990) (statement of Rep. Clay).
3. See, e.g., Seidle v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 238, 242-46
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that, because an ear infection is not a serious health condi-
tion, an employee who was terminated for being absent for four days to care for her
ill child has no claim under the FMLA).
4. See Sue Shellenbarger, How Accommodating Workers' Lives Can Be a Busi-
ness Liability, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1995, at B1 (noting that while many companies
value promoting family friendly policies, companies still worry about creating
expectations of accommodations when none can be made).
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the work force which have led to increasing tension between
job and family responsibilities. Part II reviews the law gov-
erning disqualification for benefits as it affects employees
whose family responsibilities are incompatible with their
employment. Part III considers the rationale behind the
benefits disqualification criteria and finds no barrier to con-
sidering family responsibilities in determining benefit eligi-
bility. Part IV examines the reasons why such considerations
are appropriate in today's workplace, and Part V suggests how
the law should take family responsibilities into account in
determining UI benefits eligibility.
I. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS AND THE WORKPLACE
The demographics of the workplace have changed dramati-
cally. The typical family no longer consists of a father
employed outside the home and a mother who, because she is
not so employed, is available to care for children and other
relatives in need. The percentage of women aged twenty-five to
fifty-four in the labor force increased from nineteen percent in
1900 to seventy-four percent in 1993. The number of women
in the work force increased almost 200% from 1950 to 1990.6
As of 1993, ninety-six percent of fathers and sixty-five percent
of mothers worked outside the home.7 The percentage of fami-
lies headed by single parents more than doubled from 1970,
reaching twenty-seven percent in 1993.8
The nature of working mothers' employment also has
changed. Whereas at one time, married women often were
characterized as secondary wage earners whose attachment
to the labor force was open to question,9 such is no longer the
case. For example, a May 1995 study by the Whirlpool Foun-
dation and the Families and Work Institute found that fifty-
five percent of employed women and forty-eight percent of
5. S. REP. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.A.A.N. 3, 8-9.
6. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 7-8.
7. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 8-9.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., RICHARD A. LESTER, THE ECONOMICS oF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPEN-
SATION 40 (1962) (arguing that women's greater tendency to be employed part-time
or intermittently gave them a "partial or intermittent" connection to the labor
force).
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married employed women provide at least half of their fami-
lies' income.'" Among employed married women, although
almost two-thirds believe their husbands' jobs offer more
financial security for their families than their own jobs, twen-
ty-four percent expect their jobs to provide more long-term
family financial security, an increase of fifteen percentage
points since 1981.11
Many workers find themselves not only having to care for
their children, but also for their aging parents. The fastest
growing segment of the United States population is the elder-
ly, with individuals aged sixty-five and older comprising
twelve percent of the population. 2 Between 1980 and 1990,
the population aged seventy-five and older increased by one-
third.13 An estimated twenty to twenty-five percent of all
workers have some care-giving responsibilities for an older
relative.'
The frequent shortage of reasonably priced, competent child
care aggravates the tension between workers' availability to
their jobs and their availability to their families. A recent
study by the Population Reference Bureau (PRB) illustrates
the situation. 5 The PRB found that among families where
both parents work outside the home, the most common ar-
rangement was to have the father care for the children while
the mother worked.'6 The percentage of children cared for by
their fathers while their mothers worked increased overall
from fifteen percent in 1988 to twenty percent in 1991;
among married couples the increase went from 17.9% to
22.9%."7 This change did not result from fathers' dropping out
of the work force. Rather, pressed by the cost and unavail-
ability of child care, parents work different shifts so that
each may care for the children while the other works on the
job.
18
10. FAMILIES AND WORK INST., WOMEN: THE NEW PROVIDERS 33 (1995).
11. Id. at 31.
12. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 5, at 6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 8-9.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 9-10.
15. See generally MARTIN O'CONNELL, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU,
WHERE'S PAPA?: FATHERS' ROLE IN CHILD CARE (1993) (reporting on the findings on
child-care arrangements of mothers who work outside the home and exploring the
trend in father-provided child care since the late 1970s).
16. See id. at 17 tbl. A-1.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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The changing demographics have left an increasing number
of workers vulnerable to seemingly irreconcilable conflicts
between their jobs and their families. The following Part
considers how those workers fare when they lose their jobs
and seek UI benefits.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Not all workers who are separated from their jobs are
eligible for unemployment compensation. The reason for sep-
aration may disqualify an otherwise eligible claimant. Work-
ers may be disqualified under certain circumstances if they
voluntarily leave their jobs.' They also may be disqualified if
they are discharged for misconduct.2 °
Workers whose separations qualify them for UI benefits,
nevertheless, may lose their eligibility for reasons unrelated
to termination of their prior jobs. To remain eligible for bene-
fits, claimants must be available and able to work.2 ' A claim-
ant who is otherwise eligible may be disqualified for refusing
suitable employment.22
19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3315(1) (1995); IDAHO CODE § 72-1366(e)
(1989 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-15-1(a) (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-706(a) (1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151A, § 25(e)(1) (1994); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 71-5-513(A)(1)(a) (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-628 (Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 282-A:32(I)(a) (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(a) (West 1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 96-14(1) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02(1) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4141.29(D)(2)(a) (Anderson 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120(1) (Law. Co-
op. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1344(a)(2)(A) (1987).
20. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(b) (1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151A:25,
§ 25(e)(2) (1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-513(A)(1)(b) (1973); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-628(2)(b) (Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(I)(b) (1987); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 43:21-5(b) (West 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(2) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 52-06-02(3) (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(1)(b) (Anderson
1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1344(a)(2)(B) (1987). A few states word the disquali-
fication as one resulting from discharge for cause. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 3315(2) (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-15-1(a) (West 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-
35-120(2) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
21. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-771(A)(3)-(4) (1995); CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE § 1253(c) (West 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-107(1)(c) (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 31-235(2) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3314(3) (1995); FLA. STAT. ch.
443.091(1)(c) (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-195(a)(3)(A) (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, para. 420(c) (Smith-Hurd 1986 & Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-14-
3(a)(1)-(2) (West 1991); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 8-903(a)(1)(i)-(ii) (1991);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151.A, § 24(b) (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.28(c) (1995);
MINN. STAT. § 268.08-1(3) (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-4(c)(1) (West 1991); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 801(d)(1) (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1343(a)(3) (1987).
22. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3315(3) (1995); IDAHO CODE § 72-1366(f)
(1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(c) (1993); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151A, § 25(c) (1994);
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Examples abound of how family responsibilities may cost
employees their jobs and raise issues concerning their eligi-
bility for UI benefits. An employer may refuse to allow an
employee time off to attend to a family need, may change an
employee's work schedule, or may require overtime which
conflicts with the employee's care-giving responsibilities. In
these cases, the employee may defy the employer's directives
and be terminated from employment. If the terminated em-
ployee applies for UI benefits, the employer may seek to
disqualify the claimant because the employee was discharged
for misconduct. Alternatively, if the employee resigns, rather
than comply with the employer's directive, the employer may
seek a disqualification because of a voluntary quit.
Employees whose job separations qualify for UI benefits
may still find that work-family conflicts defeat their claims.
Employees who lose their employment and restrict their job
search to certain shifts or certain days of the week to avoid
conflicts with family obligations may not be sufficiently ex-
posed to the work force to be available for work. Employees
who refuse particular jobs because they conflict with family
responsibilities may have refused suitable employment. As
the following discussion establishes, the states take dramati-
cally different approaches to these issues concerning disquali-
fication and requirements of work force availability.
A. Disqualification for Misconduct
Employees who are discharged for failing to comply with
their employers' directives because those directives conflicted
with their family responsibilities generally have fared well in
litigation over their eligibility for UI benefits. For example, in
Campbell v. Department of Labor and Employment Security,
23
the Florida District Court of Appeal held that an employee
was entitled to benefits despite having been discharged for
MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-513(A)(3) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-628(a) (Supp. 1995);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(d) (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(c) (West
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(3) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02(3) (1989 &
Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(2)(b) (Anderson 1995); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-35-120(3) (Law. Co-op. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1344(a)(2)(C)
(1987).
23. 455 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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absenteeism. The employee was absent because she was with
her daughter, who had been hospitalized in another state
following a serious car accident.24 The court found that the
duress of a family emergency and the employee's good faith
reliance upon her husband to notify the employer excused her
"fail days."
25
In Prickett v. Circuit Science, Inc. ,26 the employer tempo-
rarily changed the employee's work assignment from the first
shift, which began at 6:50 A.M. and ended at 3:20 P.M., to the
second shift, which began at 3:20 P.M. and ended at 11:30 P.M.
The employer advised the employee on a Friday that the
change would take effect the following Monday. The employee,
a single father, could not obtain child care and reported to
work on the first shift on Monday, advised his supervisor of
the situation, and was given the day off to continue searching
for child care. After numerous inquiries to licensed facilities,
neighbors, and friends, the employee informed his supervisor
that he would not report to work for the second shift because
he did not have child care. He was suspended for his unex-
cused absences and finally discharged.2
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that "the employee's
failure to report to a new shift assignment because of an in-
ability to obtain adequate [child] care ... does not constitute
misconduct justifying denial of unemployment compensation
benefits."28 The court observed that the employee faced a
substantial change in his assigned shift and had little time to
find alternate child care. In addition, the court found that the
employee had made good faith efforts to obtain child care and
had maintained contact with the employer throughout the
period in question. The court noted that a denial of benefits
would ignore the reality of the predominance of single-parent
and dual wage-earner families.29
24. Id. at 570.
25. Id. at 570-71. Today, the employee's discharge would probably violate the
provision of the FMLA which guarantees an employee the right to unpaid leave in
order to care for a child who is suffering from a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1)(c) (1994).
26. 518 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 1994).
27. Id. at 603-04.
28. Id. at 605.
29. Id. ("In 1990, almost 60% of children in Minnesota lived in families in which
both parents worked outside the home .... Another 9.3% lived in families with one
working parent.") (citation omitted).
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Most courts that have addressed the issue have regarded
conflicting family responsibilities as a factor which mitigates
against a finding of misconduct sufficient to justify a denial of
benefits. These courts have focused on the requirement that
such misconduct demonstrate wanton and willful disregard for
the employer's interests, concluding that the compulsion of
family obligations negates a finding of willfulness.
3 0
It is the compelling nature of the conflicting family and job
responsibilities which mitigates against a finding of willful-
ness. Consequently, this approach forces courts to evaluate
the gravity of the employee's family responsibilities. Where a
court considers the family responsibilities to pose a less seri-
ous conflict, it will expect the employee to comply with the
employer's directives and will view the employee's defiance as
disqualifying misconduct.31
30. See, e.g., Campbell v. Department of Labor and Employment Sec., 455 So. 2d
569, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an employee was entitled to benefits
when she was fired for absences due to caring for daughter hospitalized in another
state); Howlett v. South Broward Hosp. Tax Dist., 451 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that "the unapproved temporary absence.., for the purpose of
responding to legitimate family emergency does not constitute willful and wanton
disregard for the employer's interest ... [sufficient] to justify denial ... of unem-
ployment compensation"); Langley v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 444 So. 2d
518, 519-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (granting benefits to an employee who failed
to comply with his manager's request because his father-in-law had a heart attack);
Hartenstein v. Department of Labor and Employment Sec., 383 So. 2d 759, 761-62
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that an employee was entitled to benefits when he
was fired for an absence to attend his father's funeral); Tucker v. Department of
Commerce, 366 So. 2d 845, 846-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that an
employee was entitled to benefits when she was fired for an absence due to difficulty
in scheduling doctor's appointment for daughter's critical illness); Prickett v. Circuit
Science, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 602, 605-06 (Minn. 1994) (holding that an employee was
entitled to benefits when he was fired for absences due to his inability to find child
care after his schedule changed); McCourtney v. Imprimis Technology, Inc., 465
N.W.2d 721, 724-25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an employee was entitled to
benefits when he was fired for absenteeism caused by inability to obtain child care);
King v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 414 A.2d 452, 453-55 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1980) (holding that an employee was entitled to benefits when she was
fired for absences due to inability to find child care after schedule change); Gale v.
Department of Employment Sec., 385 A.2d 1073, 1075 (Vt. 1978) (holding that an
employee was entitled to benefits when he was fired for working an insufficient
number of hours due to child-care needs).
31. See Colachino v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 453 A.2d 72,
73-74 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) (disqualifying a claimant from receiving benefits where
he justified his refusal to work overtime by claiming that because his parents were
old he had responsibilities around the house); see also Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec.
v. Valdez, 582 P.2d 660, 660-62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that an employee's
discharge for refusing to work overtime disqualified him from UI benefits where he
failed to advise employer of the reason for his refusal).
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Not all employees, however, defy their employers' directives,
in effect daring their employers to fire them. Some decide to
quit. The next Part explores their eligibility for UI benefits.
B. Voluntary Quits
Employees who respond to employer directives that conflict
with family responsibilities by resigning from their employ-
ment have fared considerably worse in the pursuit of
unemployment compensation than have those who defied their
employers' orders and were fired. A key factor in many juris-
dictions is the language of the statutory voluntary-quit
disqualification. Some states will not disqualify an employee
who has quit voluntarily with good cause, while others require
that the good cause be attributable to the employer or be
connected to the employment.
Nowhere is the significance of statutory language more
readily apparent than in Florida. In Yordamlis v. Florida
Industrial Commission,32 the Florida District Court of Appeal
held that a single parent who quit a job because its nighttime
hours interfered with his ability to care for his children was
entitled to benefits because his voluntary resignation was for
good cause.33 Thereafter, the Florida legislature amended the
statute to require that the good cause be attributed to the
employer.34 The amendment proved crucial in Beard v. State
Department of Commerce. 5 In Beard, a correctional officer
who had been transferred from the first shift to the third shift
requested leave to arrange for nighttime care for her teenage
children. When the employer denied her request, the employ-
ee resigned.36 The court, in keeping with Yordamlis, consid-
ered her resignation to be for good cause, but held that the
intervening statutory amendment requiring that the cause be
attributable to the employer removed familial obligations as
a justification for quitting a job and obtaining UI benefits.37
Subsequently, Florida courts have consistently denied UI
32. 158 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
33. Id. at 791-92.
34. See 1963 Fla. Laws ch. 327.
35. 369 So. 2d 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
36. Id. at 383.
37. Id. at 384-85.
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benefits to employees who quit their jobs because of the need
to attend to family responsibilities.38
Many states approach the UI eligibility of employees who
quit their jobs because of family conflicts in a manner consis-
tent with Florida's distinction between good cause and good
cause attributable to the employer. States whose statutes do
not require that the cause be attributable to the employer or
to the employment have awarded benefits based on the court's
assessment of the significance and severity of the family
conflict. For example, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in
awarding benefits to an employee who was on an indefinite
leave of absence to care for her terminally ill husband and
who failed to return to work when told she might have to be
replaced, reasoned that "it would be positively inhuman to
hold that this woman voluntarily quit her job without good
cause." 9 Similarly, courts in Pennsylvania have awarded UI
benefits to employees whose family responsibilities met the
statutory requirement of a compelling and necessitous reason
for quitting employment.4 Courts in Arkansas also have pro-
vided UI benefits when a resignation is for a personal
emergency of a compelling nature.4'
38. See, e.g., Garcia v. AT&T, 575 So. 2d 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (denying
benefits to an employee who was not reinstated following a six-month leave to care
for her sick mother-in-law); Sun State Servs. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 503
So. 2d 373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (denying benefits to an employee who quit her
job to care for an ill sister).
39. Cantrell v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 450 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Ky. 1970).
40. See, e.g., Truitt v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 589 A.2d
208, 210 (Pa. 1991) (granting benefits to an employee who quit after her child care
arrangements failed and she was unable to find alternate child care); Jones v. Unem-
ployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 510 A.2d 1278, 1279 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)
(granting benefits to an employee who quit when her child care failed and the
employer refused to reduce her overtime); Hospital Serv. Ass'n v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 476 A.2d 516, 518 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (granting
benefits to an employee who quit after a schedule change and a resultant inability
to find child care for new schedule); Blakely v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 464 A.2d 695, 696 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (granting benefits to an employee
who quit after being assigned a new shift because she could not secure child care).
41. See, e.g., Wade v. Thornbrough, 330 S.W.2d 100, 101-02 (Ark. 1959) (grant-
ing benefits to an employee who quit after being denied a leave of absence to care for
her sick children); Timma v. Everett, 639 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982)
(awarding benefits to an employee who quit after employer denied him a leave of
absence to care for his injured and pregnant wife); Morse v. Daniels, 609 S.W.2d 80,
81 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (granting benefits to an employee who quit her job to care for
her ill parents); Turner v. Daniels, 605 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980)
(granting benefits to an employee who quit her job to care for her injured son).
UC and Work-Family Conflicts 141
As with the misconduct cases, courts which recognize family
concerns as providing good cause to quit a job without losing
UI benefits necessarily delve into the gravity of the concern
on a case-by-case basis, denying benefits where the court
considers the concern insufficiently serious. For example,
courts have denied benefits where child care was available to
the employee and where the employee failed to make
reasonable efforts to find child care.42
Judicial evaluation of the seriousness of the employee's
family concerns has invited judges to impose their own values
on the claimants. For example, courts have denied benefits to
an employee who quit her job rather than work a revised
schedule that precluded her from preparing the evening meal
for her husband and adult children,43 and to an employee who
quit her job because a schedule change precluded her from
caring for her grandchildren.44
Although some judicial line drawing is necessary, courts
should be wary of imposing their own cultural values on
employees and care givers. Such cultural bias may appear
when a court regards the need to care for one's children as
good cause but rejects the need to care for one's grandchil-
dren. Cultural bias clearly was present in Perdrix-Wang v.
Director of Employment Security Department.45 Perdrix-Wang
worked as a quality control chemist for a plastics manufac-
turer. She became pregnant and continued to work subject to
restrictions that she not come in contact with certain
chemicals present in the plant. After giving birth and taking
a two-month maternity leave, Pedrix-Wang returned to her
job and requested that her employer continue the accom-
modation for four months, the period during which she would
be nursing her baby, because exposure to the chemicals would
endanger the baby's health. The employer refused and gave
42. See Cedeno v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 524 A.2d 1075,
1076-77 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (denying UI benefits for claimant who failed to seek
child care to cover extended work hours); Reagan v. Unemployment Compensation
Bd. of Review, 397 A.2d 873, 874 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (denying UI benefits where
change in claimant's work location merely would have increased costs of child care).
43. See Uvello v. Director of Employment Sec., 489 N.E.2d 199 (Mass. 1986).
44. See Biggerstaffv. Review Bd., 611 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); see also
Helm v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (holding
that an employee who left her job to accompany her daughter to another state to
persuade her son-in-law not to desert from the Marine Corps was not entitled to UI
benefits because she voluntarily quit without cause).
45. 856 S.W.2d 636 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993).
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Pedrix-Wang the option of ceasing to nurse her baby or taking
a demotion to a position that did not involve contact with
chemicals. Pedrix-Wang resigned instead.46
The majority of the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial of UI benefits. In so doing, the court clearly imposed its
cultural views and values on Pedrix-Wang. The court wrote:
The mere fact that breast-feeding may be the "best" of two
available methods of feeding a child does not compel a
finding of good cause to quit in this case. Many things are
"good" for children, and may even constitute perfectly
legitimate reasons for a parent to quit work. However, the
question before the Board was not whether appellant's
purpose was legitimate; the issue was whether her reason
for quitting constituted sufficiently good cause to justify
an award of unemployment compensation. The record
supports the conclusion that appellant's decision to breast-
feed was a personal, voluntary one, unsupported by either
medical advice or any evidence of the degree to which
breast-feeding might benefit the baby or protect her from
harm.47
By insisting on evidence of medical compulsion, the court
displayed its own biased view, which degraded the importance
of breast feeding. The court was unwilling to defer to, or even
consider the reasonableness of, Pedrix-Wang's determination
as a mother that breast feeding was beneficial for her child.
The court made no inquiry into why the employer, who had
accommodated the employee during her pregnancy, suddenly
refused to continue the accommodation. Instead, it valued the
employer's absolute authority more than it valued the ability
of a mother to take action that the court acknowledged was
best for her child.
Most jurisdictions which require that the cause for a volun-
tary quit be attributed to the employer follow the Florida
model. They recognize that family obligations provide cause to
quit, but consider the cause personal and not attributable to
the employer.4" This position is taken even where the work-
46. Id. at 637-38.
47. Id. at 639.
48. See, e.g., Craig v. Dep't of Indus. Relations, 47 So. 2d 286, 286-87 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1950) (denying benefits to an employee who quit to care for a sick child); Grant
v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 558 N.E.2d 438, 439-41 (Ill. App.
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family conflict is precipitated directly by employer action,
such as a change in work hours.49
Jurisdictions that deny UI benefits to employees who quit
when employer directives conflict with family responsibilities
invite anomalous results. In general, most jurisdictions recog-
nize the presence of conflicting family obligations as a miti-
gating factor which precludes a disqualification for willful
misconduct.5 0 Yet, if the same employee quits before the
employer fires her, she will be disqualified because the cause
for her quit is not attributable to the employer. Florida has
reached precisely this result,"' and other jurisdictions are only
a decision away from the same anomaly.
Ct. 1990) (denying benefits to an employee who quit after being denied a leave of
absence to care for her newborn child); Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc., 357 N.E.2d 900,
902-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (denying benefits to an employee who quit after being
unable to secure child care after shift change); Rogers v. Doyal, 215 So. 2d 377,
377-78 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (denying benefits under similar circumstances to those in
Gray); Lyell v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 553 S.W.2d 899, 900-02 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (denying benefits to an employee for quitting due to inability to find child
care); Meggs v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 234 S.W.2d 453, 463-64 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1950) (denying benefits to an employee who quit work to help her sick hus-
band following the death of her mother).
49. See, e.g., Gray, 357 N.E.2d at 902-07. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, however, has held that a change in work schedule which conflicts with an
employee's child care responsibilities may give the employee cause attributable to
the employer to justify a quit. Zukoski v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 459
N.E.2d 467, 468 (Mass. 1984); Manias v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 445
N.E.2d 1068, 1069-71 (Mass. 1983).
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has sent conflicting signals. In Sonterre v.
Job Services, 379 N.W.2d 281, 284-85 (N.D. 1985), the court rejected the claimant's
request for UI benefits where she quit, claiming that her shift change interfered with
her child-care responsibilities and she was given inadequate time to find a baby-
sitter. The court declared that "[w]hile parental obligations may be good personal
reasons for leaving employment, they are not causes that are attributable to the
employer." Id. at 284. In Newland v. Job Services, 460 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990), the
court interpreted Sonterre as turning on a factual finding which rejected the
employee's contention that she had not been given adequate time to arrange for child
care. Id. at 122. The court held that parental obligations could establish cause
attributable to the employer, when combined with other factors, such as a substan-
tial change in schedule and insufficient notice to allow for finding child care. Id. at
123-24.
50. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
51. Compare Garcia v. AT&T, 575 So. 2d 730, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) and
Beard v. Department of Commerce, 369 So. 2d 382, 384-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(both denying benefits to employees who quit rather than comply with their employ-
ers' directives) with Dean v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 598 So. 2d 100, 101
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) and Howlett v. South Broward Hosp. Tax Dist., 451 So. 2d
976, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (both awarding benefits to employees who were
fired for defying their employers' directives).
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The result can be grounded in the difference in the lan-
guage of the two disqualification provisions. In a discharge for
misconduct case, the need to tend to family responsibilities
negates a finding of the intent necessary for disqualification:
willful and wanton disregard of the employer's interests. In a
voluntary quit case, however, the employee not only must
establish cause for resignation, but also must link that cause
to the employer. As developed below, adherence to this
rationale to justify the different treatment of discharges and
resignations precipitated by identical concerns, however,
greatly elevates form over substance.
When an employee faces an employer's insistence on com-
pliance with its directive, despite the conflict with the em-
ployee's family responsibilities, the end result is no different
if the employee says, "I quit," or "I won't, so fire me." The
former actually may be less disruptive to the employer be-
cause the employer will know of the need to replace the
employee. If the employee defies the employer's directive, the
employer may not know whether it can obtain future compli-
ance or whether discharge is appropriate.
It might be argued, however, that when employers deny
accommodation requests, they expect their employees will
comply with their directives, rather than quit. When an em-
ployee defies the employer's directive, the employer faces a
clear choice between accommodation and termination of the
employment. An employee who responds to the employer's
refusal of an accommodation request by quitting denies the
employer the choice.
The argument that employees who quit deny their employ-
ers the final choice between accommodation and employment
termination has at least two flaws. First, any reasonable
employer in today's work place must realize that when it
denies an employee's request to accommodate family obliga-
tions, it runs a risk of precipitating a conflict that will result
in termination of the employment relationship, either through
resignation or discharge. An employer may protect against
such risk by leaving open the option to accommodate the
employee if the employee cannot make arrangements to
comply with the employer's directive. It is unreasonable for an
employer to test the strength of the employee's accommo-
dation request by daring the employee to risk discharge
through insubordination.
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Second, almost all cases involve work schedules.52 Employee
responses to being scheduled in ways that are incompatible
with family obligations often do not come neatly packaged as
quits or discharges. Employees who simply refuse to report at
their scheduled times may be viewed as quitting by their
conduct or as engaging in misconduct leading to discharge.5"
The substance of the transaction is the same, but the form by
which it is characterized can determine whether the employee
will receive UI benefits.54
Even a strict formalist may have difficulty reconciling the
voluntary quit cases with the discharge for misconduct cases.
Recognizing that the cause for resignation must be attribut-
able to the employer to justify UI benefits merely begs the
question of how to define the cause for the quit. If the cause
is the employee's conflicting family obligations, then it is
personal to the employee. If, however, we recognize that
employees frequently have family obligations, then the cause
of the resignation may be viewed as the employer's imposition
of a new work schedule or other refusal to accommodate the
employee's family needs. Under such a view, the cause is
attributable to the employer.
55
The latter view actually is implicit in the willful misconduct
cases. Recognizing that family needs mitigate against a
finding of willful and wanton disregard of the employer's
interests is equivalent to recognizing that employers may not
insist absolutely that employees sacrifice their families' wel-
fare whenever the employer so commands. Where such insis-
tence results in discharge, the employee will be entitled to UI
benefits. If an employer may not condition an employee's job,
or more precisely an employee's UI eligibility, on an absolute
52. The only case that my research uncovered that did not involve work sched-
ules was Perdrix-Wang v. Director of Employment Security Department, 856 S.W.2d
636 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993). See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
53. Such was the case, for example, in Craig v. Department of Industrial Rela-
tions, 47 So. 2d 286, 294 (Ala. Ct. App. 1950).
54. See, e.g, Gale v. Department of Employment Sec., 385 A.2d 1073, 1075 (Vt.
1978).
55. This approach was taken to a limited extent by the court in Newland v. Job
Services, 460 N.W.2d 118, 124 (N.D. 1990) (holding that a substantial shift change
with unpredictable hours was good cause attributable to the employer). Fifty years
ago, one commentator observed that a narrow reading of a statutory requirement
that the good cause for a voluntary quit be attributable to the employer improperly
injects issues of employer fault into the eligibility analysis. See Earle V. Simrell,
Employer Fault vs. General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment Compensation, 55
YALE L.J. 181, 183 (1945).
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sacrifice of the employee's family's welfare, then the employer
whose refusal to accommodate the employee's family needs
forces the employee to quit should be held accountable for
that refusal in an UI proceeding.
Perhaps in implicit recognition of the voluntary quit case
law's incompatibility with the discharge for misconduct stan-
dards, Indiana courts have developed a different approach in
some schedule change cases. The courts have reasoned that,
although an employer controls the hours that employees are
required to work, employees may place conditions on their
availability for work.56 If such limitations are communicated
to and accepted by the employer, they are binding. If the
employer subsequently refuses to abide by the agreed-on
limitations, the employee may quit with cause attributable to
the employer or may defy the employer's directives, in which
case any discharge will be without cause. In either event, the
employee will be eligible for unemployment compensation. If,
however, the employee agrees to the changed schedule, either
expressly or implicitly, by continuing to work for the employ-
er, and subsequently quits or is fired due to an inability to
maintain that schedule, the court will consider the discharge
as disqualifying misconduct and the quit as a disqualifying
resignation without cause.
Although the Indiana approach treats discharges and resig-
nations comparably, its solution is as unsatisfactory as the
one it replaces. First, employees with family obligations that
limit their availability to work are more likely to seek jobs
with schedules compatible with those obligations than to
demand restrictions as a condition of their employment.
Second, family obligations change over time. Employees have
children and their parents age and develop medical conditions
requiring greater care. In some cases, employees may
negotiate expressly for schedule flexibility that enables them
to meet changing family needs-particularly where an em-
ployee returns to work from parental or other family leave. It
is just as likely, however, that an employee will rely on an
existing work schedule and arrange for supplemental care
around that schedule. In such cases, no negotiations with the
employer are necessary, but the consequences of a subsequent
scheduling change can be just as severe as if the work
56. See Moore v. Review Bd., 406 N.E.2d 325, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Jones v.
Review Bd., 399 N.E.2d 844, 845 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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schedule had been negotiated. In both cases the employees
have relied on existing work schedules in meeting their family
obligations and face the same potential disruptions when their
schedules change.
Third, the typical employment relationship is terminable at
will, thereby rendering fictitious the concept of an ongoing
contractual obligation to maintain a particular schedule.
Moreover, the Indiana approach penalizes the conscientious
employee who, despite the conflict between the new schedule
and family obligations, decides to try the new schedule and
quits or is fired after finding that the new schedule simply
will not work. In such a case the employee will be held to
have accepted the new schedule and be denied UI benefits.
Had the same employee rejected the new schedule and insist-
ed on adhering to previously communicated schedule restric-
tions, the employee would have been granted benefits.57
Thus, the existing approach to the eligibility for UI benefits
of employees who lose their jobs because of work-family con-
flicts leaves much to be desired. Employees whose job loss
results from causes independent of family responsibilities may
still be denied benefits where family obligations restrict the
types of jobs they are able to take. As the following two Parts
reveal, the law in this area has similar deficiencies.
57. Closely related to the treatment of whether the cause of a voluntary quit is
attributable to the employer is the treatment of leaves of absence taken in response
to family needs. Where leave has been granted without prejudice to reinstatement
upon return and the employer subsequently refuses to reinstate the employee, courts
tend to grant UI benefits. See, e.g., Department of Indus. Relations v. Price, 151
So. 2d 797 (Ala. Ct. App. 1963); Keays v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 592 So. 2d
1255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). Where leave is granted without a job guarantee,
however, and the employee, upon returning from leave, is denied reinstatement,
courts tend to find a voluntary quit without cause attributable to the employer. See,
e.g., Garcia v. AT&T Communications, 575 So. 2d 730 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991);
Grant v. Board of Review, 558 N.E.2d 438 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). The courts reason that
the quit occurred at the time leave was taken and, therefore, the cause of the quit
was personal and not attributable to the employer. Employees facing such circum-
stances must be astounded to learn that UI law treats a leave of absence as equiva-
lent to quitting the job. Although the absence of a job guarantee may save the
employer from breach of contract liability for failure to reinstate the employee
returning from leave, the employer's failure to reinstate the employee should not
justify denying UI benefits.
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C. Suitable Employment
Claimants who are not disqualified from receiving benefits
because of the way in which their employment terminated
may still face disqualification if they decline offers of suitable
employment without just cause. Traditionally, considerations
of the suitability of a job offer were limited to the offered job's
required skill level, responsibility, and compensation. Under
this approach, conflicts between the offered job and the claim-
ant's family responsibilities do not render the job unsuitable
and do not provide cause for rejecting the offer.5" The Tennes-
see Supreme Court explained that consideration of personal
matters such as family responsibilities in determining suit-
ability, "would be placing in the hands of the employee the
right to determine when and under what conditions she would
work. Such a holding would unduly restrict the employer and
could conceivably, under certain circumstances, make it al-
most impossible to carry on a business during certain
hours."
9
Other courts have found conflicts between family responsi-
bilities and an offered job relevant in determining disqualifi-
cation. Some courts consider the conflicts as rendering the job
unsuitable. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court held that
a job was not suitable work because its requirement of exten-
sive overnight travel risked ruining the claimant's marriage
and impeded the claimant's ability to care for his two sons
from a prior marriage.6 ° The court held that the employee was
entitled to UI benefits despite rejecting a job which required
much travel.
Other courts have found the work suitable but also have
found good cause for rejecting the job offer if family responsi-
bilities would compel a reasonable person to do the same.6 1
58. See, e.g., Pohlman v. Ertl Co., 374 N.W.2d 253 (Iowa 1985); Swanson v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 61 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1953), overruled by
Prickett v. Circuit Science, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 1994); Aladdin Indus., Inc.
v. Scott, 407 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1966).
59. Alladin Indus., 407 S.W.2d at 164.
60. Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 589 P.2d 89 (Idaho 1979).
61. See, e.g., Yordamlis v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 158 So. 2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963) (holding that an employee had good cause to reject a job which, because
of its rotating hours, was incompatible with his child-care responsibilities); Martin
v. Review Bd., 421 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that an employee had
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Often, where family responsibilities involve young children,
courts require a showing that the claimant attempted to find
child care before rejecting the job offer.62
As with the discharge for misconduct cases, courts that
allow beneficiary recipients to reject job offers that conflict
with their family obligations invite anomalies if they also take
a formalistic interpretation of their states' requirement that
if the state is to allow benefits, voluntary quits be for cause
attributable to the employer.
The anomaly is best illustrated by the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in In re Watson. 3 Ms. Watson's
employer laid her off from her job on the first shift.
Subsequently, she was offered work on the second shift, which
she rejected because it was incompatible with her child-care
responsibilities.6 4 The court observed that parental respon-
sibilities are not cause attributable to the employer and,
accordingly, could not justify an award of benefits to an
employee who quit her job. Because no such "attributable to
the employer" restriction is placed on the cause which justifies
a rejection of otherwise suitable work, however, the court held
that Ms. Watson was not disqualified from benefits.
65
Essentially, timing meant everything to Ms. Watson's claim.
Had her employer transferred her immediately to the second
shift and thereby induced her resignation, the court would
have denied her benefits as a voluntary quit because the
child-care responsibilities that would have made her quit
would not have been attributable to the employer. She re-
ceived benefits, however, because her employer first laid her
off and then sought to recall her to the second shift, thereby
allowing the court to characterize the issue as cause for a
rejection of a job offer rather than as a voluntary quit. Other
courts also have noted the anomaly and, like the Watson
good cause to reject a nightshift position because it conflicted with her child-care
responsibilities); Shufelt v. Department of Employment and Training, 531 A.2d 894
(Vt. 1987) (holding that an employee may have had good cause to refuse a job on the
nightshift because of child-care responsibilities).
62. See, e.g., Jurkiewicz v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 477
A.2d 583, 586 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984); Brink v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 392 A.2d 338, 340 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978); Wolford v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Bd. of Review, 384 A.2d 1035, 1037 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978); In re Appeal
for Fickbohm, 323 N.W.2d 133, 136 (S.D. 1982).
63. 161 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1968).
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id. at 7.
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court, have hidden behind the cloak of formal statutory con-
struction to justify the result.66
D. Availability for Work
Employees whose separation from their jobs was not related
to their family responsibilities and who have not rejected any
job offers may still be denied benefits because family obliga-
tions restrict their availability for work.67 Phyllis Doctor was
one such employee. Ms. Doctor was a single parent and a
nurse who was unemployed and otherwise qualified for UI
benefits. She was offered a position working "swing shift," 3
P.M. to 11 P.M., which she declined because it was inconsistent
with her child-care responsibilities.68 The Oregon Court of
Appeals held that the work was suitable but that Ms. Doctor
had cause to reject it. Nevertheless, the court disqualified Ms.
Doctor from receiving benefits, reasoning that nurses had to
be available to work all shifts. Because Ms. Doctor's parental
responsibilities limited the shifts she was able to work, the
court concluded that she was not sufficiently available for
work to receive benefits.69
Courts in several states have generalized the Oregon court's
view of nurses to cover all UI claimants, regardless of occupa-
tion.7' These courts maintain that UI claimants must unequiv-
66. See, e.g., Beard v. Department of Commerce, 369 So. 2d 382, 385 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 589 P.2d 89, 97 (Idaho 1979); Gray
v. Dobbs House, Inc., 357 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976). The court in Martin
v. Review Board, 421 N.E.2d 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), tried to justify the distinction
as encouraging stable employment by requiring an employee to remain in an existing
job, but allowing the unemployed to reject jobs that are incompatible with family
obligations. Id. at 656-57. The logic of this reasoning evaporates when we realize
that the unemployed merely are allowed to reject offers ofjobs which, had they been
forced to accept, they would have been precluded from quitting.
67. See Doctor v. Employment Div., 711 P.2d 159 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); see also
Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Department of Employment Serv., 512 A.2d 301, 303 n.2 (D.C.
1986) (noting the availability issue but declining to decide it).
68. 711 P.2d at 160.
69. Id. at 161-62.
70. See, e.g., Leclerc v. Administrator, 78 A.2d 550 (Conn. 1951); Ford Motor Co.
v. Appeal Bd., 25 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Mich. 1947); Thompson v. Schraiber, 90 N.W.2d
915, 916 (Minn. 1958), overruled by Prickett v. Circuit Science, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 602,
606 (Minn. 1994); York v. Morgan, 517 P.2d 301, 302 (Or. Ct. App. 1973); Nurmi v.
Employment Sec. Bd., 197 A.2d 483, 487 (Vt. 1963), overruled by Shufelt v. Depart-
ment of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894, 898 (Vt. 1987); Jacobs v. Office of
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ocally expose themselves to the labor market. Such unequivo-
cal exposure entails availability to take any shift on any day.
Consequently, a claimant whose availability is limited by
family responsibilities is not eligible for benefits.
Many courts have rejected the proposition that family
responsibilities automatically preclude a claimant from being
sufficiently available for work to receive UI benefits.' These
courts recognize that family responsibilities may provide
cause for a claimant to reject otherwise suitable employment.
Under such circumstances, if the hours that claimants remain
available expose them to a substantial field of employment,
they have met the availability for work requirement.
The different results stem from different views of the func-
tion of the availability requirement. Courts that require
twenty-four hour availability also regard the unemployed
worker as obligated to do everything at all costs to find suit-
able employment. Consequently, family obligations which
restrict the worker's schedule potentially reduce the odds that
the worker will find a job and constitute grounds for disquali-
fication. Courts which do not impose such a requirement, in
contrast, accept that workers have responsibilities which
compete with their jobs for their time. Their inquiry thus
Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 179 P.2d 707, 717-18 (Wash. 1947).
The York court made explicit what is implicit in the other opinions, namely that it
regarded family responsibilities as inconsistent with being an available worker:
While sound public policy indicates that concern for family is to be encouraged,
it does not follow that unemployment compensation may be used to foster it.
Unemployment compensation is designed to ease the burden of those who are
generally available in the labor market but for whom no suitable gainful
employment is available. It was not created to ease the burden of those who for
one reason or another are not generally available.
517 P.2d at 302. See also Deborah Maranville, Feminist Theory and Legal Practice:
A Case Study on Unemployment Compensation Benefits and the Male Norm, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1081 (1992) (describing Washington's UI system which disqualifies
claimants who limit their hours of availability or limit their job searches to part-time
employment and discussing a challenge brought against the part-time disquali-
fication).
71. See, e.g., Arndt v. Department of Labor, 583 P.2d 799, 802-03 (Alaska 1978);
Sanchez v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 569 P.2d 740, 750 (Cal. 1977); Hacker
v. Review Bd., 271 N.E.2d 191, 196-97 (Ind. App. 1971); Renwanz v. Review Bd., 267
N.E.2d 844, 846-47 (Ind. App. 1971); Conlon v. Director of Employment Sec., 413
N.E.2d 727, 731 (Mass. 1980); Wiler v. Board of Review, 80 N.E.2d 190 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1947); Huntley v. Department of Employment Sec., 397 A.2d 902, 904-05 (R.I.
1979); Shufelt v. Department of Employment & Training, 531 A.2d 894, 898 (Vt.
1987).
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focuses on whether, even with the restrictions occasioned by
family responsibilities, the worker continues to have a reason-
able chance of finding employment.
III. WHY THE Fuss? RATIONALES FOR THE
DISQUALIFICATION STANDARDS
Courts are fond of saying that the disqualification standards
ensure that UI benefits are paid only to workers who are
unemployed through no fault of their own." The concept of
fault, however, does not describe the disqualification stan-
dards with sufficient precision to be helpful. On the one hand,
workers who quit their jobs because of conflicting family
obligations cannot be faulted for their actions; yet, under the
law in many jurisdictions, they are disqualified from UI
benefits because the cause of their quit is not attributable to
their employers.73 On the other hand, workers whose negli-
gence may justify their discharge often are awarded benefits
because their culpability does not rise to the level of willful
72. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Employment Div. Dep't, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 705, 707
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993); McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc. v. Roman, 645 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Cheung v. Executive China Doral, Inc., 638 So. 2d 82, 84 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Brown v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 633 So. 2d 36, 41
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Young v. Scott, 442 S.E.2d 768, 770 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994);
Lafferty v. Review Bd., 600 N.E.2d 1378, 1385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Hacker, 271
N.E.2d at 196; Prickett, 518 N.W.2d at 604; Division of Employment Sec. v. Labor &
Indus. Relations Comm'n, 884 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Kansas City
Club v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 840 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992);
In re Watson, 161 S.E.2d 1, 6-8 (N.C. 1968); Newland v. Job Servs., 460 N.W.2d
118, 122 (N.D. 1990); Gillins v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 633
A.2d 1150, 1154 (Pa. 1993); Helmick v. Martinsville-Henry County Economic Dev.
Corp., 421 S.E.2d 23, 26 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); Casper Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unem-
ployment Ins. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 387, 394 (Wyo. 1993). The language, "unemployed
through no fault of their own," appears to have its origin in a model state unem-
ployment compensation bill drafted by the Social Security Board to assist states in
enacting legislation that would take advantage of the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act's tax offset provision. Concerned with protecting the legislation against consti-
tutional attack, the drafters provided a statement of purpose that the act was
designed to set aside reserves to benefit persons unemployed through no fault of
their own. See Gladys Harrison, Forenote: Statutory Purpose and "Involuntary
Unemployment," to Eligibility and Disqualification for Benefits, 55 YALE L.J. 117,
118 (1945).
73. See supra Part II.B.
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and wanton disregard of their employers' interests7 4 and,
therefore, is not a disqualifying discharge for misconduct.75
Because employer UI payroll taxes are experience rated,76
one could argue that an employer should not be held account-
able for employment termination due to an employee's family
circumstances which were beyond the employer's control.
Because experience rating is not synonymous with fault,
however, a consideration of employer fault is improper.7 7 UI
benefits are awarded under many circumstances where the
employer is not at fault for terminating the employment
relationship. 8 Moreover, the extent to which employers are
able to pass the UI tax along to consumers in the form of
higher prices or to employees in the form of lower wages and
benefits further undermines the experience-rating argument.7 9
Rather than apportioning fault between employers and
employees, the disqualification standards may be considered
more precisely to divide UI claimants into job losers and job
leavers, with only the former entitled to benefits. To
understand the reasons for the distinction, it is necessary to
consider some of the economic effects of unemployment
compensation.
In some instances, UI benefits may reduce spells of unem-
ployment. Benefits paid to covered workers may provide them
with resources needed to conduct effective job searches.80 In
74. See A.L. Schwartz, Annotation, Work-Connected Inefficiency or Negligence as
'Misconduct" Barring Unemployment Compensation, 26 A.L.R. 3d 1356 (1969 &
Supp. 1995).
75. See Paul T. Fenn, The Law and Economics of the Misconduct Rule of Unem-
ployment Insurance, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAw 307, 311 (Paul Burrows &
Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981) (contrasting United States UI law which disquali-
fies for willful misconduct with British UI law which disqualifies for negligence).
76. Experience rating refers to the practice of adjusting the employer's UI tax
rate based on the number of claims paid to that employer's former employees.
77. See Simrell, supra note 55, at 181.
78. For example, employers may not be faulted when reduced demand for their
products or services causes them to lay off employees.
79. The degree to which employers are able to pass along the UI tax has
generated considerable discussion, yet no consensus exists among economists. See,
e.g., PATRICIA M. ANDERSON & BRUCE D. MEYER, THE INCIDENCE OF A FIRM-VARYING
PAYROLL TAx: THE CASE OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (1995); DANIEL S.
HAMERMESH, JOBLESS PAY AND THE ECONOMY 12-15 (1977); LESTER, supra note 9, at
65-67; Patricia M. Anderson & Bruce D. Meyer, Unemployment Insurance in the
United States: Layoff Incentives and Cross Subsidies, 11 J. LAB. ECON. S70, $84-86
(1993).
80. See HAMERMESH, supra note 79, at 33.
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addition, UI may provide an incentive to workers who are not
covered to find employment faster to secure coverage.
81
Nevertheless, many economists believe that UI increases
unemployment in two ways.8 2 First, experience ratings are
imperfect in that there are levels below which the employer's
tax may not fall and above which it may not rise. Thus, em-
ployers with a high level of job terminations are subsidized by
those with a more stable work force. This subsidy may provide
an incentive for employers to lay off employees more frequent-
ly.
83
Second, the availability of unemployment compensation
causes covered unemployed workers to increase their reserva-
tion wages-to be choosier in deciding what jobs they will seek
and accept. This phenomenon leads to increases in the
duration of covered workers' periods of unemployment. Econ-
omists base this conclusion on studies which link increases in
the amount or duration of UI benefits to increases in the
duration of unemployment.84
The limitation on UI benefits to job losers instead of job
leavers represents an attempt to balance the social purposes
served by U185 against the tendency of UI to contribute to
81. Id. at 37; Dale T. Mortensen, Unemployment Insurance and Job Search
Decisions, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 505, 505-06 (1977).
82. Because of these effects, Professor Rappaport has called for an examination
of privatizing UI. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Private Provision of Unemployment
Insurance, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 61, 62.
83. See Katharine Abraham & Susan Houseman, Job Security in America, 11
BROOKINGS REV. 34-35 (Summer 1993); Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Unemploy-
ment Insurance on Temporary Layoff Unemployment, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 834 (1978).
84. See, e.g., HAmERMESH, supra note 79, at 33, 36-37; John M. Barron & Wesley
Mellow, Unemployment Insurance: The Recipients and Its Impact, 47 S. ECON. J. 606
(1981); Kathleen P. Classen, The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on the Duration
of Unemployment and Subsequent Earnings, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 438 (1977);
Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Ronald L. Oaxaca, Unemployment Insurance, Duration of
Unemployment and Subsequent Wage Gain, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 754 (1976); Arlene
Holen, Effects of Unemployment Insurance Entitlement on Duration and Job Search
Outcome, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 445 (1977); Floyd C. Newton & Harvey S.
Rosen, Unemployment Insurance, Income Taxation, and Duration of Unemployment:
Evidence from Georgia, 45 S. ECON. J. 773 (1979); see also Paul Fenn, Sources of
Disqualification for the Unemployment Benefit, 1960-76, 18 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL.
240,242 (1980) (discussing factors, including availability of unemployment compensa-
tion, which lowers search costs and, in turn, contributes to the decision to quit a job).
But see HAMERMESH, supra note 79, at 38 (noting that the effect of UI on duration of
unemployment is smaller, and possibly zero, during periods where unemployment
rate is above six percent).
85. These social purposes include providing a safety net for workers who lose
their jobs and stabilizing the economy by maintaining the purchasing power of
unemployed workers. See YOUNG-HEE YOON ET AL., NATIONAL COMM'N FOR EMPLOY-
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unemployment. One writer has suggested that a major portion
of the higher unemployment rate in Canada may be attributed
to Canada's more liberal UI law which grants benefits to job
leavers and labor force reentrants, as well as to job losers. s6
When UI is viewed strictly as insurance, a UI system faces
the same problem of moral hazard that any other insurance
system faces. The problem arises where an insured or a bene-
ficiary has the ability to take action which triggers the insurer's
duty to pay benefits. Insurers commonly deny coverage if the
insureds might alter their behavior because of the provision of
insurance. For example, fire insurance policies typically do not
pay benefits when insureds intentionally set fire to their own
property.
The moral hazard problem in UI is heightened by the ab-
sence of a link between eligibility for benefits and financial
need.87 Disqualification from benefits of employees discharged
for willful misconduct, those who voluntarily quit, and those
who reject offers of suitable employment, are designed to deal
with the moral hazard problem.8" The disqualification for a
voluntary quit precludes insureds from triggering benefit
awards through their own actions, and disqualification for
refusing suitable employment precludes insureds from ex-
tending benefits through their own conduct. Disqualification
for misconduct also guards against moral hazard by denying
benefits to insureds whose actions are likely to lead to their
dismissals.89
MENT POLICY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: BARRIERS TO ACCESS FOR WOMEN AND
PART-TIME WORKERS 1 (1995).
86. See Vivek Moorthy, Unemployment in Canada and the United States: The
Role of Unemployment Insurance Benefits, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. Q. REV. 48 (Winter
1989-90).
87. See Eveline M. Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic
Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. 1, 16-17 (1945). There is considerable disagreement among
economists as to which group of workers is most susceptible to moral hazard. Some
consider lower wage workers as most susceptible because UI benefits replace a
greater proportion of their take-home pay than higher income workers. Others regard
higher income workers as more likely to alter their behaviors due to the presence of
UI benefits because they are more likely to have savings and other resources
available to supplement their benefits during periods of unemployment. For further
discussion, see Paul L. Burgess & Jerry L. Kingston, Monitoring Claimant
Compliance with Unemployment Compensation Eligibility Criteria, in UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE 136, 140-41 (W. Lee Hansen & James F. Byers eds., 1990).
88. See Fenn, supra note 75, at 309-11; Paul H. Sanders, Disqualification for
Unemployment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REV. 307 (1955).
89. See Fenn, supra note 75, at 311; Fenn, supra note 84, at 242-45.
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Recognizing that the disqualifications for voluntary quits,
misconduct discharges, and suitable work refusals share a
common purpose, that of guarding against moral hazards
frequently encountered in insurance, further highlights the
irrational and blind adherence to formalism of those jurisdic-
tions which apply different standards to these disqualification
grounds, usually treating most harshly workers who volun-
tarily quit their jobs.90 This analysis, however, merely begs the
question. If all three disqualifications are to be subject to a
common analysis, is there a role for conflicting family re-
sponsibilities in that analysis?
Unemployment insurance, of course, is not a private insur-
ance contract. Consequently, in interpreting the disqualification
provisions, the need to guard against moral hazards must be
balanced against the social, economic, and political purposes
behind providing UI benefits.9 This balance is most readily
apparent in the treatment of disqualifications for rejecting
suitable employment.
If the sole purpose of the disqualification for rejecting suit-
able employment were to reduce the risk that the availability
of UI would influence insureds' behaviors, the disqualification
would encompass rejection of any offer of employment, not just
offers of suitable employment. The availability of UI tends to
increase the length of covered workers' spells of unem-
ployment by increasing their reservation wages. 92 The social
purpose behind limiting disqualification to refusals of suitable
employment is to enable workers to raise their reservation
wages.9 3 The definitions of suitable work and of good cause to
refuse suitable work raise public value judgments concerning
how choosy unemployed workers may be and on what factors
they may base their choosiness.
Traditionally, unemployed workers have been allowed to
reject work that would cause them significant drops in income
90. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 88, at 311 (suggesting that mobility of labor
and reasonableness of employee action must be considered in determining the
provision of benefits).
92. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
93. It is also consistent with what some economists have termed the "common
language" view of unemployment where a "'worker is viewed as unemployed by the
community if he is perceived as identical to other workers with respect to preferences
and skills and yet is unable to find the number of hours of work that others have
both chosen and managed to find.'" Fenn, supra note 84, at 244 (citation omitted).
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or would not utilize their skills and talents.94 Defining suitable
work as work commensurate with a claimant's skill,
experience, and prior wage rate represents a social and eco-
nomic value judgment that it would be wasteful to force
workers into underemployment. Rather, they should be al-
lowed time to try to find work that pays at or near their
former wage levels and that utilizes the skills employed in
their former jobs.95 There is evidence that the system works in
this manner. Studies have found that increasing UI benefits
increases the duration of unemployment but also increases the
wage rate at which the unemployed worker finds employ-
ment.96
Thus, the definition of suitable work as applied to a worker
with family responsibilities requires a public value judgment.
Should we allow unemployed workers to be selective with
respect to the relationship between offered employment and
family obligations, just as we allow them to be selective about
the relationship between offered employment and the level of
skills, responsibility, and wages in their former employment?
Defining disqualifying misconduct and good cause attribut-
able to the employer requires making similar value judgments.
An employee who defies an employer's directive to work
overtime because of a need to care for a child or an elderly
parent is, in some senses, acting just as willfully as an
employee who defies such a directive because of a desire to
gather with friends at a nearby tavern. The issue is not will-
fulness in an abstract sense, but how society values the
94. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
95. See HAMERMESH, supra note 79, at 90-91; Ewan Clague, The Economics of
Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 53, 71-72 (1945) (arguing that the
nation's productivity will be higher if skilled workers are allowed time to find
employment at previous skill and wage level). Linking suitable work to an employee's
former wage rate also helps prevent the system from having a depressive effect on
wages and working conditions. Burns, supra note 87, at 18. For critical analysis of
this approach, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance: American Social
Wage, Labor Organization and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L. REV. 259, 322-29 (1994).
96. See, e.g., Ehrenberg & Oaxaca, supra note 84, at 764-65 (finding such an
effect for older men and women but not for younger men and women); Holen, supra
note 84, at 446 (finding such an effect generally); Joe A. Stone, The Impact of Unem-
ployment Compensation on the Occupation Decisions of Unemployed Workers, 17 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 299, 306 (1982) (finding that UI benefits increase the likelihood
that workers will find employment in their usual occupations and will avoid employ-
ment in lower paying occupations for which they also are qualified). But see Classen,
supra note 84, at 430 (presenting a study of unemployed workers in Arizona and
Pennsylvania in the 1960s finding that increases in UI benefits do not produce more
lucrative jobs for beneficiaries).
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employees' needs for accommodations and the employers'
refusals to provide the requested accommodations. A similar
analysis applies in evaluating the UI claim of an employee
who resigns rather than comply with the employer's direc-
tive-particularly when the payment of unemployment com-
pensation does not require a finding of fault on the part of the
employer.97
The eligibility requirement that a UI claimant be available
for work serves a different purpose than the disqualifications
discussed above. In order to receive benefits, job losers must
remain attached to the labor force.98 Whether attachment to
the labor force requires twenty-four hour availability necessi-
tates a value judgment which balances the degree to which
unemployed workers, by restricting their availability, reduce
the likelihood that they will find jobs against the reasons
behind the workers' restrictions.
Feminist writers have suggested that the twenty-four hour
availability requirement discriminates against women by
embodying a male norm.99 Such characterization, however, is
incomplete and does not accurately portray the twenty-four
hour rule. The rule reflects a stereotype that is based on
white middle-class and upper-income families of the 1950s
and 1960s. The stereotype of women as full-time homemakers
who could tend to family responsibilities at all hours, thereby
freeing their husbands up for twenty-four hour work
availability, never applied to low-income black women.100 It
97. See Simrell, supra note 55, at 181.
98. See, e.g., Lind v. Employment Sec. Div. of Dep't of Labor, 608 P.2d 6, 8 (Ala.
1980); Harper v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 293 A.2d 813, 815-16 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1972); Cumming v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 382 A.2d 1010, 1015-16
(D.C. Ct. App. 1978); Industrial Comm'n v. Ciarlante, 84 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1955);
Fleiszig v. Division of Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 104 N.E.2d 818,
820-21 (Ill. 1952); Mohler v. Department of Labor, 97 N.E.2d 762, 764 (Ill. 1951);
Bolles v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n Appeal Bd., 105 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Mich.
1960); In re Thomas, 186 S.E.2d 623,626 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972); Scardina v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Bd. of Review, 537 A.2d 388, 390 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987); Willard
v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 173 A.2d 843, 847 (Vt. 1961); Louise F.
Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 YALE. L.J. 123, 124 (1945); Lee G.
Williams, Eligibility for Benefits, 8 VAND. L. REV. 286, 291 (1955).
99. See, e.g., Maranville, supra note 70, at 1086; Elizabeth F. Thompson,
Comment, Unemployment Compensation: Women and Children-The Denials, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 751 (1992).
100. See, e.g., PATRICIA H. COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (1990); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST
THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 133-35 (1984); Nancy A. Hewitt, Beyond the
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also does not accurately characterize low-income white
families. 10'
Today, fathers are the most common care givers for their
children in two wage-earner households during the time that
their wives are at work. This is not because of massive role
reversal with fathers leaving the work force. Rather, it is due
largely to married parents working separate shifts so that
each can care for the children while the other is at work.
10 2
Moreover, although women who request that their employers
accommodate their family responsibilities continue to encoun-
ter employer disfavor, employer hostility is far more perva-
sive when the identical request is made by a man. 103 If the
twenty-four hour availability requirement ever embodied a
male norm, it certainly does not continue to do so.' °4
The requirement that UI claimants be available for work
and the disqualification of claimants who are discharged for
misconduct, quit their jobs without cause attributable to their
employers, or refuse suitable employment are designed to
limit UI benefits to job losers who remain attached to the
labor force. The application of these provisions, however, to
workers whose family responsibilities conflict with the de-
mands of the workplace requires making public value judg-
ments. Accordingly, the next Part examines evolving public
values where work and family conflict.
Search for Sisterhood: American Women's History in the 1980s, in UNEQUAL SIS-
TERS: A MULTICULTURAL READER IN U.S. WOMEN'S HISTORY 1, 10 (Vicki L. Ruiz &
Ellen C. DuBois eds., 1994).
101. I believe that my own experience was more typical of white working-class
families during the 1950s and 1960s. Out of economic necessity, both of my parents
worked outside the home and my father also moonlighted nights and weekends. We
shared an apartment with my grandmother who cared for my sister and me while
my parents were at work. If my grandmother had become unable to provide child
care, we would have faced the same situation as many of the claimants in the
litigation discussed in Part II.
102. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
103. See Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047,
1077-79 (1994).
104. The conflict between availability for work and family responsibilities,
largely parental, is not new. The issue received considerable attention during World
War II, when wartime production caused many factories to operate around the
clock, staffed by large numbers of women whose husbands were serving in the
armed forces and who lacked child care. See Ralph Altman & Virginia Lewis,
Limited Availability for Shift Employment: A Criterion of Eligibility for Unem-
ployment Compensation, 22 N.C. L. REV. 189 (1944).
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IV. EVOLVING PUBLIC JUSTICE VALUES IN
WORK-FAMILY CONFLICTS
The changing demographics of the work force have precipi-
tated a reevaluation of what society considers to be just de-
mands which employers may make on employees when those
demands conflict with the employees' family responsibilities.
Nowhere is this reevaluation of public values more evident
than in the enactment of the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA or Act).0 5
The FMLA requires that those who employ at least fifty
workers in at least twenty calendar weeks of the current or
preceding year'0 6 provide eligible workers with twelve weeks
of unpaid leave within twelve months of the birth or adoption
of a child. The Act also requires that leave be available when
an employee is needed to care for a child, parent, or spouse
who has a serious medical condition.' 7 Employees returning
from leave must be reinstated to their former positions or to
equivalent positions.' 8 While on leave, employees must re-
main eligible for health insurance benefits under the same
terms as if they were not on leave.0 9
The FMLA represents a national determination that em-
ployers have a legal duty to accommodate their employees'
family responsibilities under certain circumstances. Congress
considered arguments made by many employers that impos-
ing such a duty would unduly harm their businesses."0 It
105. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994)).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (1994).
107. Id. § 2612(a)(1).
108. Id. § 2614(a)(1).
109. Id. § 2614(c)(1).
110. See, e.g., The Family & Medical Leave Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 5 Before
the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs & Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on
Labor & Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 87-90 (1991) (statement of
National Federation of Independent Business); id. at 95-96 (statement of Associated
Builders & Contractors); id. at 96-98 (statement of National Association of Manu-
facturers); id. at 99 (statement of Florists' Transworld Delivery Association); id. at
100-03 (statement of National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors and the
Wholesale Distribution Industry); The Family & Medical Leave Act of 1989: Hear-
ings on S. 345 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs & Alcoholism of the
Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 31-43 (1989)
(testimony of Carol Ball, co-owner and Chief Executive Officer of Ball Publishing
Co., on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce); The Family & Medical Leave Act
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discounted those arguments by pointing to employers who
found that providing family leave enhanced their business-
es."' Furthermore, Congress determined that any employer
inconvenience was justified by the important social functions
family leave would serve.
Specifically, Congress was presented with considerable
evidence of the importance of bonding between parents and
their newborn babies or their newly adopted children." 2
Congress further cited to consensus of medical opinion that
the presence of family members during a patient's treatment
for a serious health condition benefits the patient and may
speed the patient's recovery." 3 Indeed, Congress' failure to
mandate the availability of leave for less serious medical
conditions did not result from a congressional belief that such
leave was not needed. Rather, Congress believed that such
needs already were met by routinely provided sick leave." 4
The FMLA's opponents agreed with the Act's supporters
that it is unjust to compel employees to choose between their
jobs and their family responsibilities. These opponents did
not defend employers who deny employees leave to care for a
seriously ill family member, or newborn or newly adopted
children. Rather, they argued that the goal of providing fami-
ly leave for all employees could be met more effectively by
providing tax credit incentives for employers instead of man-
dating that employers provide leave." 5 Thus, the FMLA is a
of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 770 Before the Subcomm. on Labor Management Relations
of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 110-12 (1989)
(testimony of J. Robert Wingert, Jr., Corporate Director of Human Resources for
Dentsply Int'l Inc., on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers); id. at
124 (testimony of John Motley, Director of Federal Governmental Relations for the
National Federation of Independent Business); Parental & Medical Leave Act of
1987: Hearings on S. 249 Before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs &
Alcoholism of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 100th Cong. 1st
Sess. 96-129 (1987) (testimony of Frances Shaine, U.S. Chamber of Commerce); Id.
at 130-41 (testimony of Mary Del Brady, President, National Association of Women
Business Owners).
111. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 5, at 12-14, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.A.A.N. at
14-17. It appears that Congress was right to discount claims of employer hardship.
The available evidence shows that the employer community adapted to the FMLA
with relative ease. See WILLIAM M. MERCER, INC. & UNIVERSITY OF CAL., BERKELEY,
SURVEY RESULTS: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (1994).
112. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 5, at 9 (reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 11-12.
113. Id. at 10, reprinted in U.S.C.A.A.N. at 12-13.
114. H.R. REP. No. 8, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 40 (1993); S. REP. No. 3,
supra note 5, at 28, reprinted in U.S.C.A.A.N. at 30.
115. See 139 CONG. REC. S10-95 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Dole);
id. at S1261 (remarks of Sen. Smith); id. at S1346 (remarks of Sen. Dole); id. at
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public declaration that values highly providing employees job
security to enable them to fulfill family obligations. I term
this recognition of the primacy of family responsibilities and
the just expectation of employer accommodation of those
responsibilities a "public justice value."
The FMLA recognizes that public justice values mandate
some employee protection even after workers have exhausted
their FMLA leave and are subject to discharge. For example,
the statute requires employers to maintain health insurance
coverage for employees on leave, but allows them to recoup
insurance premiums from employees who do not return to
work at the conclusion of their leaves. 116 It protects employ-
ees against such recoupment, however, if a dependent's seri-
ous health condition or circumstances beyond the employee's
control preclude the employee's return to work.
117
UI systems should offer employees similar protection. For
example, employees who take FMLA leave to care for serious-
ly ill family members and lose their jobs because the illnesses
extend beyond twelve weeks should receive unemployment
compensation regardless of whether they are considered to
have quit or to have been discharged for failing to return
from leave." 8
The public justice values which underlie the FMLA should
extend UI benefits to workers who lose their jobs in certain
situations despite FMLA protection not being available. To
illustrate, consider a situation where a father receives word
at work that his child, while walking home from school, has
been taken to the hospital after being struck by a car. The
father's employer denies his request to leave work, telling the
father that his presence on the job is essential and suggest-
ing that his wife cover the emergency. The father defies his
employer's order to stay on the job in order to be with his son
and is terminated. 119
H367 (remarks of Rep. Quillen); id. at H368-69 (remarks of Rep. Grandy); id. at
H369 (remarks of Rep. Dunn); id. at H372 (remarks of Rep. Pryce); id. at H375
(remarks of Rep. Kolbe); id. at H401 (remarks of Rep. Dunn); id. at H402 (remarks
of Rep. Porter); id. at H409-10 (remarks of Rep. Gunderson).
116. 29 US.C. § 2614(c) (1994).
117. Id. § 2614(c)(2)(B).
118. Of course, to be eligible for benefits, the employees will still have to meet
the availability for work requirement.
119. Cf Launius v. Des Plaines Bd. of Fire and Police Comm'rs, 603 N.E.2d 477
(Ill. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2337 (1993) (involving a police officer discharged for
leaving post to be with wife and children whom he believed were in danger due to
severe flooding).
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If, upon arriving at the hospital, the father finds that his
child has been hurt seriously enough to be admitted, the
discharge amounts to an unlawful denial of FMLA leave. 2 ° If
however, the father finds that his son has suffered only mi-
nor bruises and is released with no need for further medical
follow-up, the child's injuries probably do not qualify as a
serious health condition and the discharge does not amount
to a denial of FMLA leave. 12 ' Nevertheless, the public justice
values embodied in the FMLA suggest that the father's fami-
ly responsibilities are highly relevant to determining whether
the circumstances under which he lost his job should disqual-
ify him for UI benefits.
Public recognition of the primacy of employee family re-
sponsibilities has gone beyond the care of newborns, newly
adopted children, and seriously ill family members. One area
of public concern is parental involvement in their children's
schooling. United States Secretary of Education Richard
Riley has called publicly for employers to provide flexible
schedules and time off to enable working parents to increase
their involvement in their children's schools, citing the link
between such involvement and improved student achieve-
ment.
122
State legislatures have gone further than Secretary Riley.
A few states have mandated that employers provide up to a
specified amount of time off for employees to attend parent-
teacher conferences and other school activities where such
activities cannot be scheduled so as to avoid conflict with the
employee's work day. 123 Other states, while not mandating
120. This is because confinement in a hospital automatically satisfies the
statutory definition of serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)(A) (1994).
121. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a) (1995). It is possible that the discharge might still
violate the FMLA as an illegal interference, restraint, or denial of leave rights. 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1994). To find such a violation, a court would have to conclude
that denial of leave to tend to a family member where there is a reasonable belief
that that family member is suffering from a serious health condition interferes with
FMLA rights. Whether courts will interpret the FMLA in this manner, however, is
highly speculative. For further discussion of the interference, restraint, or denial
provision of the statute, in the context of workplace hostility, see Malin, supra note
103, at 1089-94.
122. Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., U.S. Aims to Reduce Parents' Work Hours, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 8, 1994, § 1, at 8.
123. For example, California mandates that employers allow working parents up
to eight hours per month and up to 40 hours per year to participate in their chil-
dren's school activities. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996). In
enacting the statute, the California Legislature found that children whose parents
are involved in their education perform better academically and that parents are
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that employers provide time off to enable parents to attend
activities at their children's schools, have taken steps to
encourage employers to do so.
124
Another area in which publicjustice values concerning work-
family conflicts are evolving is the attitude toward employer
discipline, discharges, and related actions against employees
covered by collective bargaining agreements.125 Typically those
agreements require just cause for discipline and discharge and
provide that grievances alleging breach of the agreement may
be submitted to final and binding arbitration.
Some arbitrators have refused to recognize that family
obligations are relevant to deciding whether discipline or
discharge is for just cause. For example, in Town of
Stafford,12 the town suspended a police officer for five days for
insubordination when she refused an order to report for duty
at noon, instead of her regular start time of 4 P.M. Although
the grievant had child care available to enable her to report at
4 P.M., she was unable to secure child care for the earlier start
time.'27 In rejecting the grievance, the arbitrator stated that
it was the grievant's responsibility to obey all proper employer
orders, rather than the employer's responsibility to accommo-
date the grievant's family needs.
128
the most important citizen group in terms of school support. See Assembly Bill
2590, § 2 (Sept. 30, 1994).
Similarly, Illinois requires employers to allow employees to take up to eight
hours per school year to attend school conferences or other school activities which
cannot be scheduled so as to avoid conflict with the work day. See 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 147/15 (State Bar 1994). The statute further requires that employers allow
employees to make up the missed time so as not to lose compensation provided that
the make-up would not force the employer to pay overtime wages to the employee.
Id. at 147/20. Minnesota requires employers to provide up to 16 hours in a 12-
month period for employees to attend school conferences or other classroom activi-
ties. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.9412 (West 1993).
124. For example, the Alabama Legislature adopted a resolution calling on
employers to provide at least one hour of leave per month during the school year to
enable parents to attend conferences and other school events. Act 159, L-1994 (Feb.
25, 1994), discussed in [Emp. Proc. Guide] Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 7 (May 2, 1994).
Louisiana has sought to encourage leave to attend school activities through a
statute which provides that employers may grant up to 16 hours of leave per year
for that purpose. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1015.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996).
125. For a discussion of cases involving these issues, see Julie Glass, Note, Re-
thinking the Work-Family Conflict in the Labor Arbitration Context, 19 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 867 (1992); Michael Marmo, Work Versus Family Obligations: An
Arbitral Perspective, ARB. J., Sept. 1991, at 14.
126. 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 513 (1991) (Stewart, Arb.).
127. Id. at 513.
128. Id. at 514; see also Washtenaw County, 80 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 513 (1982)
(Daniel. Arb.).
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Other arbitrators, however, have been far more receptive to
employees' family obligations. For example, in Allied Paper,
Inc.,129 the arbitrator overturned the grievant's three-day
suspension when he refused to report for mandatory overtime
because his wife was seriously ill with cancer and he had no
other care giver.
130
In Rochester Psychiatric Center,13 1 the grievant, a single
parent of children aged five years and fourteen months, had
been assigned to the 3 P.M. to 11:20 P.M. shift. Grievant was
on notice that she was expected to work overtime on a regular
periodic basis and that her name had reached the top of the
overtime rotation, making her subject to call. Determination
of the need for overtime necessarily was made late in the shift.
Grievant received little notice that she was required to work
a second eight-hour shift. She twice refused to work the
mandatory overtime because she had no one to care for her
children. She had been suspended on two prior occasions for
the same offense. This time the employer sought to discharge
her.
132
The arbitrator recognized the employer's legitimate need to
compel overtime and to spread the overtime evenly among all
of the employees. He also recognized the grievant's needs to
care for her children, and observed that "[n] o person should be
forced to choose between his children or his livelihood."133 He
found that the grievant was technically insubordinate in
refusing to work the overtime, but concluded that "[n]o arbi-
trator on earth would sustain discharge on the facts of this
case."134 Using the just cause provision of the contract, he
effectively imposed on the employer a duty to accommodate
the grievant's parental needs despite its legitimate need to
have her work overtime. He allowed the state to impose a one
dollar fine against the grievant, and ordered both parties to
agree on three days per month, arranged thirty days in ad-
vance, during which time the grievant would be available to
129. 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 435 (1983) (Mathews, Arb.).
130. See also Ashland Oil, Inc., 91 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1101 (1988) (Volz, Arb.)
(holding that, although employee was properly disciplined for leaving job in the
middle of mandatory overtime to pick up his children, absence of alternative was
considered a mitigating factor, and suspension was reduced from three days to one
day).
131. 87 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 725 (1986) (Babiskin, Arb.).
132. Id. at 726.
133. Id. at 727.
134. Id.
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work overtime. In the arbitrator's view, this would meet the
employer's needs and afford the grievant sufficient opportunity
to arrange for overnight child care in advance, instead of on
only a few hours' notice.
135
Similarly, in Jones Operation & Maintenance Co.,136 an
employee, whose shift had begun at 9 A.M. to accommodate her
parental obligations, took maternity leave. When she sought
to return to work, her employer changed her start time to 7:30
A.M. The employee was unable to find child care to enable her
to adjust to the earlier start time and so advised the employer.
Nevertheless, the employer terminated her. 13 In upholding
the grievance in its entirety, the arbitrator stressed the
employee's need for a later start time and the absence of any
justification on the employer's part for denying her a schedul-
ing accommodation. 3 ' There are numerous other examples
where arbitrators have interpreted or applied collective
bargaining agreements in light of the pressing demands of
employees' family responsibilities. 3 9
There is an evolving public justice value judgment that work-
ers should not be required to meet every employer demand re-
gardless of its impact on their family responsibilities and that
employers have an obligation to attempt to accommodate
135. Id. at 728.
136. 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 239 (1989) (Schwartz, Arb.).
137. Id. at 239-40.
138. Id. at 242.
139. See, e.g., Social Sec. Admin., 93 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 687 (1989)
(Feigenbaum, Arb.) (holding that an employer should not have denied the employee
a personal emergency day, and marked her AWOL, when the employee learned on the
morning of the day of her absence that her regular and back-up child care providers
were unavailable and employee called employer to report the same); Knauf Fiber
Glass, 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 333 (1983) (Abrams, Arb.) (holding that discharge was
not warranted, despite employee's very poor attendance record, where final absence
leading to discharge arose when grievant left work after being informed that her four-
year-old daughter had fallen and was being taken to the hospital emergency room);
Washington Nat'l Airport, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1018 (1983) (Everitt, Arb.) (order-
ing that employer reassign grievant to midnight shift where disciplinary reassign-
ment to day shift caused hardship to grievant and his wife, both of whom were
working parents, and where grievant performed without disciplinary incident on day
shift for one year); County of Monroe, 72 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 541 (1979)
(Markowitz, Arb.) (holding that, although employee's attendance record would, under
normal circumstances, have justified discharge, discharge was reduced to suspension
and employee was reinstated without back pay on a last chance basis where employee
absences were due to problems with her children, and troubled child had received
psychological counselling, making it likely that employee could return without
repeating absenteeism problem); Globe Union, Inc., 77-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH)
8462 (1977) (Fitch, Arb.) (holding that problems in arranging child care presented
an urgent personal hardship, warranting a shift change).
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employees' family responsibilities. Statutes now require em-
ployers to accommodate the needs of new parents, of workers
needed to care for seriously ill family members, and of parents
of school-age children. Arbitrators interpreting just cause and
similar contractual provisions have recognized employer obliga-
tions to attempt to accommodate a wide range of employee
family responsibilities. How these evolving public justice values
should inform determinations whether to award unemployment
compensation is explored in the following Part.
V. How UI BENEFIT LAWS SHOULD ADAPT
TO WORK-FAMILY CONFLICTS
We have previously seen that disqualifications for miscon-
duct and for voluntary quits serve identical purposes and
should be treated under the same standard to avoid arbitrary
and anomalous results. Even the blind formalism which
grounds such results in statutory language requiring that the
cause of a voluntary quit be attributable to the employer
evaporates upon recognition that there is now a growing
public expectation that employers have a role to play in ac-
commodating employee family obligations. The question
remains, however, how should family obligations be considered
when evaluating the UI claims of workers who have been fired
or quit their jobs? In answering this question, it is important
to keep in mind that disqualifications for discharges and
resignations are not intended to assess employee or employer
culpability. Rather, they are designed initially to draw a line
between job losers and job leavers, thereby protecting the
insurance fund from added risks induced by moral hazard. 4 '
The issue becomes whether, and under what circumstances, as
a matter of social, economic, or political policy, we wish to
have the UI fund assume the risk that the employee's family
obligations will be incompatible with the job.
Current UI jurisprudence which recognizes that discharges or
quits resulting from conflicting family responsibilities may be
compensable begins by evaluating the claimant's conduct. Thus,
UI adjudicators and courts are forced to evaluate the impor-
tance of the claimant's family needs and the reasonableness of
140. See supra notes 86, 89 and accompanying text.
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the claimant's efforts to meet those needs short of loss of em-
ployment, for example, by seeking alternate caregivers.' 4 '
Evolving public justice values, however, suggest that it is
appropriate for an employee, in the first instance, to explore
with the employer the availability of an accommodation for the
employee's family needs. Although, under current law, employ-
ers are obligated to make such accommodations only under
limited circumstances, the issue in a UI proceeding is not
whether the employer acted improperly in denying the employ-
ee's accommodation request, but rather whether a resulting
job loss should be compensable.
In determining whether the job loss is compensable, the
initial inquiry should be whether the claimant requested an
accommodation from the employer and advised the employer
of the basis for the request. The UI system should not insure
against the risk of employees who leave their jobs without
having first explored the possibility of accommodation with
their employers.'42
If the employee requested an accommodation for family
responsibilities, the next question should focus on whether the
employer had a legitimate business reason for declining the
request. Focusing the inquiry on the reasons why the employer
refused the accommodation request embodies a value judg-
ment that in today's society, employees should be insured
against the risk that their employment will terminate where
their employers refuse, without reason, to accommodate their
family needs.
This emphasis on whether the employer had a business
reason to deny the employee's accommodation request will not
eliminate all need to draw lines. For example, UI referees and
courts still may have to decide whether particular accom-
modation requests relate to family responsibilities. 4 3 UI
141. See supra notes 31, 42-47 and accompanying text.
142. See Department of Economic Sec. v. Valdez, 582 P.2d 660 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978); cf. Safeway Stores, Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 657 (1983) (Wilmoth, Arb.)
(holding that employer had just cause to discharge employee who had taken a two-
week leave of absence to care for her husband who had been injured and who
extended the leave by another week without communicating with employer).
143. For example, in Colachino v. Review Board, 453 A.2d 72 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1982), the court denied UI benefits to an employee who was fired for refusing to work
overtime. The employee had justified his refusal, stating that because his parents were
old, he had responsibilities around the house. Id. at 74. Under an approach which
evaluates the employer's reason for denying a request to accommodate an employee's
family needs, a UI referee or court still would have to determine whether claimants
such as Colachino had family responsibilities which required accommodation.
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referees and courts, however, will avoid the type of line draw-
ing that requires them to evaluate the particular family need
asserted.
For example, this approach would have precluded the court
in Perdrix-Wang v. Director of Employment Security Depart-
ment 44 from denying UI benefits because it valued breast
feeding an infant differently than the claimant. The issue in
Perdrix-Wang would not be whether the court believed that
the employee needed to nurse her child. Rather, recognizing
that the employer accommodated the employee's need to avoid
certain chemicals during her pregnancy, the inquiry would be
whether anything changed to preclude the employer from
continuing the accommodation during the period that she was
nursing.
Similarly, in Helm v. Unemployment Insurance Commis-
sion,'45 the court denied the claimant UI benefits when she
quit her job to accompany her daughter to another state in an
effort to persuade her son-in-law not to desert from the Marine
Corps. The court was not persuaded that the claimant's ac-
tions were necessary.'46 The relevant inquiry in deciding what
risks of unemployment have been insured against, however,
should not focus initially on the court's second guessing of the
employee as to what actions are necessary for her family.
Rather, the court should ask whether there was any reason for
the employer to refuse to give the employee time off.
Focusing the inquiry on the employer's reasons for denying
the accommodation provides additional benefits beyond avoid-
ing judicial line drawing that second guesses employees'
assessments of their family needs. It sets a standard that
expects employers to accommodate employee family responsi-
bilities where there is no reason for them not to do so. To the
extent that such a standard has an effect on employer behav-
ior, it will promote accommodations which, in turn, may lead
to more stable employment.
14 7
144. 856 S.W.2d 636 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993); see supra notes 45-47 and accompany-
ing text.
145. 600 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
146. Id. at 480.
147. A significant number of employers have reported that federally mandated
family leave has enabled them to retain workers who otherwise would have left the
firm. WILLIAM MERCER, INC. & UNIVERSITY OF CAL., BERKELEY, supra note 111, at
19-20 (including survey findings that 31.7% of employers reported that statutorily
mandated family leave had a beneficial effect on employee morale as opposed to 1.2%
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Requiring legitimate business reasons for a denial of an
employee's accommodation request also responds to a common
employer fear that granting one accommodation request will
lead to numerous others that the employer could not possibly
grant and continue to run the business. The grant of an initial
accommodation request which poses no harm to the business
would not obligate the employer to grant future requests if
they conflict with legitimate business needs. The speculative
future harm that the initial request may engender, however,
should not justify denial of the initial request. 4 '
There would, however, be a significant number of occasions
where, for good business reasons, employers would be unable
to accommodate employees' family responsibilities. If, when
faced with employer inability rather than employer refusal to
accommodate, an employee resigns or defies the employer's
directive and is fired, the relevant inquiry should become
whether, in light of conflicting family responsibilities, the
employee acted out of a reasonable belief that there was no
other choice available.
It might be argued that requiring such a fact-based inquiry
into employee motivation would impose too high a cost on UI
agencies. This is not likely to be the case because the reason-
ableness of an employee's belief is an objective standard
common in UI law, and one with which courts already have
practice. Employees, for example, are not disqualified for UI
benefits where they act based on a reasonable fear for their
health and safety.'49
The reasonableness of the employee's belief that he had no
other choice focuses the inquiry more precisely than the
current tendency of courts to evaluate the adequacy of the
employee's search for alternative care givers. 15 When an
who reported a negative effect, and that 12.5% reported a beneficial effect on
employee retention as opposed to 0.4% who reported a negative effect).
148. Similarly, courts in Illinois, interpreting that state's requirement that dis-
qualifying misconduct discharges must harm the employing unit, have insisted on
showings of tangible harm, rather than speculation or fear of future harm. Zuaznabar
v. Board of Review, 628 N.E.2d 986, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Adams v. Wood, 565
N.E.2d 53, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
149. See, e.g., Moore v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 215 Cal. Rptr. 316 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985); McCrocklin v. Employment Div. Dep't, 205 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984); Rabago v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 148 Cal. Rptr. 499 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1978); Wolfgram v. Employment Sec. Agency, 291 P.2d 279 (Idaho 1955); Lee
Hosp. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 637 A.2d 695 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993); Boogay v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 405 A.2d 1112 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1979); Peery v. Rutledge, 355 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1987).
150. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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employee faces a schedule change or when existing child care
or elder care arrangements fail, an unsuccessful search for
alternative care givers may establish the reasonableness of the
employee's belief that there was no other choice. The absence
of such a search, however, should not compel an automatic
finding against the claimant.
Other factors which should be considered include the hours
of work and the employee's financial means. For example, low-
wage workers may establish the reasonableness of their
decisions if friends, neighbors, or relatives are unavailable to
care for their dependents. This is particularly true for those
forced to work late-night hours. For example, Illinois uses
most of its funding for low-income child care to subsidize day
care centers instead of giving child care vouchers to parents.
This makes child care, other than through friends and rela-
tives, unavailable to low-income workers forced to work at
night.
151
Another factor to consider is the length of time the employee
has been in the work force and the length of time the employ-
ee has had the particular family responsibilities. New parents
or employees caring for elderly relatives for the first time are
likely to face crises when their usual care givers are not
available. Over time, however, employees develop networks on
which they can rely in coping with emergencies. The inquiry
in all cases must be focused on the particular circumstances
of the employee in question.
The above analysis is also useful to evaluate alleged refusals
of suitable work. Current UI jurisprudence allows workers to
reject job offers which pay substandard wages or do not utilize
their skills. This reflects a social policy determination that it
is wasteful to use UI to force employees into underemploy-
ment. 52
Evolving public justice values recognize that the demands of
the work place must accommodate family responsibilities. Just
as the suitability of work is a determination focused on the
individual claimant's wage history, skills, and related charac-
teristics, the suitability determination should also focus on the
individual claimant's family responsibilities. As with employ-
ees whose employers are unable to accommodate their family
151. Interview with Margaret Stapleton, Attorney, Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago, in Chicago, Ill. (Mar. 10, 1995).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 91-96.
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responsibilities, the inquiry should be whether the claimant
made a reasonable determination that there was no choice but
to reject the offered job.
The requirement that UI claimants be available for work
insures that they maintain their attachment to the labor force.
The twenty-four hour availability rule simply makes no sense
in today's work place. Restrictions on worker availability due
to family responsibilities are quite common and do not signify
a lack of attachment to the labor force. Courts which have
recognized this in recent years have reformed the availability
test to one of whether the claimant, in spite of the imposed
restrictions, remains attached to a significant portion of the
labor market. Because these decisions involved reversals of
benefit denials which were based on the twenty-four hour rule,
the courts remanded the cases to the UI agencies to apply the
reformed test. Consequently, we are lacking an established
body of judicial precedent concerning the details of determin-
ing significant labor market attachment.
Claimants whose family responsibilities restrict their avail-
ability fall into two categories: those who lost jobs which were
compatible with their family obligations because of changes in
the jobs themselves and those who lost jobs because changes
in their family responsibilities were met either by an employ-
er's refusal to accommodate or an employer's inability to
accommodate which left the employee no reasonable alterna-
tive to job loss. Claimants in the former group include those
who were laid off or discharged for reasons other than dis-
qualifying misconduct and those who faced schedule changes
that were incompatible with their family needs.
The loss of a job which had been compatible with the claim-
ant's family needs should, at least initially, establish the
claimant's significant attachment to the labor market, as long
as the claimant does not further restrict her availability.
153
The absence of immediate job openings with schedules that
meet the claimant's restrictions does not require a different
conclusion because the very purpose of UI is to compensate for
the lack of appropriate job vacancies.154
Claimants whose job losses have been caused by changes in
their family responsibilities are in a somewhat different
153. See Williams, supra note 98, at 294 ("It is indispensable to proper adminis-
tration of unemployment insurance laws that the claimant be presumed to be avail-
able for work unless cause for doubting that availability appears.").
154. Id. at 291.
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position. They are unable to point to their former jobs as
evidence that a market exists for workers with their skills who
are subject to their scheduling restrictions. Nevertheless,
unless their limitations are so severe as to evidence only a
marginal interest in working, these claimants also should
initially be presumed to be available for work. The question of
whether their restrictions have so limited their availability
that they are no longer attached to a labor market may best
be answered by allowing them a reasonable opportunity to see
if they can find work compatible with their family needs. 55
For both categories of claimants, the issue of availability
may change with the duration of unemployment. Just as
claimants may be expected to expand their job searches be-
yond positions commanding their highest skill levels or paying
wages comparable to their former jobs as their periods of
unemployment increase, so too may workers be expected to
reevaluate their priorities between the competing demands of
family and labor market. As the duration of unemployment
increases, workers will have had time to seek alternatives to
restricting their availability to meet their family needs. The
main idea, however, is that once society recognizes that family
responsibilities are part of the determination of what con-
stitutes suitable employment, then treatment of the effects of
job search restrictions on availability for work should not
differ whether the restrictions are related to skill level or
scheduling to accommodate family responsibilities.
CONCLUSION
The demographics of the workplace have changed signifi-
cantly. There have been dramatic increases in two wage-
earner families, single-parent families and in the number of
workers responsible for caring for elderly parents and
seriously ill relatives. When workers are forced to choose
between family and job and, as a result, find themselves
unemployed, they may seek unemployment compensation.
155. Cf. Freeman, supra note 98, at 127 (making a similar point with respect to
claimants who limited their job searches to positions at their highest skill levels
during the conversion from war-time to peace-time economy). Similar allowances are
made for other worker restrictions, such as an allowance for those who restrict their
searches to full-time positions. See Maranville, supra note 70, at 1090-91.
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Employees who are terminated because they defy employer
demands which conflict with their care-giving responsibilities
may face disqualification for UI benefits for having been
discharged for misconduct. Employees who resign rather than
comply with an employer's directive may face disqualification
because of a voluntary quit that was not for cause attributable
to the employer. UI claimants who restrict their job searches
to certain shifts or certain days of the week to avoid conflicts
with family obligations may not be sufficiently exposed to the
work force to be considered available for work. Claimants who
refuse particular jobs because they conflict with family re-
sponsibilities may have refused suitable employment.
The states have taken dramatically different approaches to
these issues. Some recognize family responsibilities as a
relevant consideration in evaluating employee behavior said
to disqualify the employee from benefits. Others do not. Some
reach seemingly anomalous results, disqualifying employees
who resign rather than comply with employer directives that
conflict with family responsibilities, while granting benefits to
employees who defy their employers and are fired.
Unemployment compensation in the United States is de-
signed for job losers rather than job leavers. This protects the
UI system against commonplace insurance moral hazard
problems and reflects the conventional economic view that the
availability of unemployment compensation increases unem-
ployment. When benefits are provided, unemployed workers
increase their reservation wages, reduce their search intensi-
ties, and take longer to find work.
Disqualifications for discharges for misconduct, quits without
just cause attributable to the employer, unavailability for work
and rejections of suitable employment operationalize the
restriction of unemployment benefits to job losers. These terms,
however, are laden with value judgments and assumptions.
Public and private workplace values are evolving to recog-
nize that employees' family obligations may curb employer
autonomy in directing the work force. These values are evident
in the FMLA, state laws mandating time off for parents to
attend school activities, and in arbitration awards interpreting
and applying collective bargaining agreements to employees
faced with work-family conflicts. Evolving public justice values
recognize a growing belief that employers have a role in
accommodating employees' family obligations. These values
should be applied in evaluating UI claims.
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Employees who lose their jobs because of conflicts with
family responsibilities should not be denied UI benefits if they
requested an accommodation of their employers and their
employers denied the request without a legitimate business
justification. Employees whose employers were unable to
accommodate their family responsibilities should still be
granted benefits if their actions resulting in job loss were the
product of reasonable beliefs that they had no other choice
available to them. Family responsibilities which conflict with
the requirements of particular jobs render those jobs unsuit-
able and a UI recipient should be able to reject such jobs
without losing benefits. Family responsibilities which restrict
employees' schedule availability generally should not result in
determinations that the employees are unavailable for work
and therefore not eligible for UI benefits. Such refinements in
the interpretation of UI eligibility criteria are necessary to
update the UI system developed in the 1930s to the reality of
the workplace of the 1990s.
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